An Investigation of Risk Management Issues in the Context of Emergency Response Systems by Kim, Jin Ki et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 2005 Proceedings Americas Conference on Information Systems(AMCIS)
2005
An Investigation of Risk Management Issues in the
Context of Emergency Response Systems
Jin Ki Kim
University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, jkkim3@buffalo.edu
Raj Sharman
SUNY Buffalo, rsharman@buffalo.edu
H. Raghav Rao
SUNY Buffalo, mgmtrao@buffalo.edu
Shambhu Upadhyaya
SUNY Buffalo, shambhu@cse.Buffalo.EDU
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2005
This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 2005 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Jin Ki; Sharman, Raj; Rao, H. Raghav; and Upadhyaya, Shambhu, "An Investigation of Risk Management Issues in the Context of
Emergency Response Systems" (2005). AMCIS 2005 Proceedings. 463.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2005/463
Kim et al.                                                                                                                Risk management issues in the emergency response systems
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th-14th 2005
An investigation of risk management issues
in the context of emergency response systems
Jin Ki Kim
State University of New York at Buffalo,
Management Science and Systems
jkkim3@buffalo.edu
Raj Sharman
State University of New York at Buffalo,
Management Science and Systems
rsharman@buffalo.edu
H. Raghav Rao
State University of New York at Buffalo,
Management Science and Systems
& Computer Science and Engineering
mgmtrao@buffalo.edu
Shambhu Upadhyaya
State University of New York at Buffalo,
Computer Science and Engineering
shambhu@cse.buffalo.edu
ABSTRACT
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, efforts to enhance risk management have taken on increased importance both
at the national and state levels. Most current incident response systems do not consider risk as part of the decision making
scenario. To effectively mitigate multi-incident coordinated terrorist threats, it is important to consider risk in incident
management systems. Based on the review of previous literature, this study proposes a theory-based risk framework for an
emergency response system. Proof of concept is provided by applying the framework to two separate existing incident
management systems - the urban search-and-rescue system and the biological detection systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, efforts to enhance risk management have taken on increased importance both
at the national and state levels. Most current incident response systems do not consider risk as part of the decision making
scenario.
This study aims at investigating risk management issues in the context of emergency response systems. We review various
existing emergency or incident management systems, analyze risk management tools, and articulate the risks of emergency
response systems.
INCUMBENT INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Various incident management systems have been developed over the past several years and are available for use today.  Each
of these systems has its own differing objectives, features, characteristics, and structures respectively. In this section we
describe some of the most prominent one.
In the late 1960s, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)1  was given the responsibility to build an Emergency
Management Information System for the Wage Price Freeze (EMISARI). EMISARI was used for transportation strikes, coal
strikes, petroleum, chlorine, and natural gas shortages, and more severe natural disasters. EMISARI allowed 200 to 300 users
scattered throughout the country to exercise a coordinated response to crisis situations (Turoff, 2002). The system design
focused on group communication process and how humans gather, contribute, and utilize data in a time-urgent manner. The
objective of the system was to allow distributed and probably dispersed groups of people to track and coordinate their
1 The OEP was the civilian agency that could exert command and control over all federal resources upon the declaration of a
federal emergency. In emergency situations the OEP could take over direct command and control of any federal resources
(Turoff, 2002).
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activities as needed. A key to the performance of the system was its ability to keep track of what people are actually
searching for and provide a list of what is being searched for and not found (Turoff, 2002).
Another example of incident management is the Center for Research on Unexpected Events (CRUE), whose mission is to
help transform the United States government’s ability to respond to unexpected events by building on revolutionary IT
development systems. CRUE’s major research groups cover agents, sensor networks and fusion, situation awareness,
geographic information systems, and information integration. The new research, technology, and infrastructure might initially
be aimed at improving the ability to respond to unexpected disasters (Arens and Rosenbloom, 2003).
On February 28, 2003, the President issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of
Domestic Incidents, which allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident
Management System (NIMS). NIMS integrates best practices that have proven effective over the years into a comprehensive
framework for use by incident management organizations in an all hazards context nationwide (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2004).
Among the different kinds of possible attacks, potential for biological attacks and chemical warfare are perceived as more
likely. Biological agents can be manufactured in facilities that are inexpensive to construct, that resemble pharmaceutical,
food, or medical production sites, and that provide no detectable sign that such agents are being produced. The biological
agents are likely to be used in a terrorist attack (Fatah, Barrett, Arcilesi, Ewing, Lattin, and Moshier, 2001).2
Incident
systems
Objectives Features or Characteristics Citations
EMISARI Designed to deal with severe
disasters such as transportation
(coal) strikes, petroleum
(chlorine, natural gas) shortages
Search experts
Group communications (200-300 users)
Collaborative Delphi process
Turoff (2002)
CRUE Response to unexpected events IT development
Geographic information systems
Information integration
Arens and Rosenbloom
(2003)
COPLINK Sharing law enforcement-
related information
Multiple data sources
Different user interfaces
Concept space
Atabakhsh, Schroeder,
Chen, Chau, Xu, Zhang,
and Bi (2001); Chen,
Zeng, Atabakhsh,
Wyzga, and Schroeder
(2003); Wang, Chen, and
Atabakhsh (2004)
NIMS Integration existing best
practices into a consistent,
nationwide approach to
domestic incident management
Integration existing practices of incident system
Consistent nationwide to enable Federal, State,
and local governments and private-sector and
nongovernmental organizations
U.S. Department of
Homeland Security
(2004)
Table 1. Incumbent Incident Management Systems
*: EMISARI: Emergency Management Information System for the Wage Price Freeze
   CRUE: Center for Research on Unexpected Events
   CRASAR: Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue
NIMS: National Incident Management System
2 For detail, refer to Fatah, et al. (2001).
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Components of Incident Management System
Typically the core activities for incident management system consist of rapid detection, precise diagnostics, and right
response. First of all, detecting early is the most important thing in overcoming the emergent situation. A good monitoring
system is required for better incident management systems. The second aspect is precise diagnosis. It is a basis for accurate
response, as shown in the following step.
Figure 1. Components of Incident Management Systems
For instance, biological agent detection systems generally consist of four components: the trigger/cue, the collector, the
detector, and the identifier. Figure 1 shows a flow diagram for a typical point detection automated architecture system.
Trigger technology is the first level of detection that determines any change in the particulate background at the sensor
indicating a possible introduction of biological agents. Detection of an increase in the particulate concentration by the trigger
causes the remaining components of the detection system to begin operation. Sampling of the biological agent is a crucial
part of the identification system. Once a sample has been collected/concentrated, it must be determined if the particulates are
biological or inorganic in origin. To accomplish this, the sample is passed to a generic detection component that analyzes the
aerosol particles to determine if they are biological in origin. This component may also classify the suspect aerosol with
broad categories. If the sample exhibits characteristics of biological particles, it is passed through to the next level of analysis.
If the sample does not exhibit such characteristics, it is not passed to the next level of analysis, thereby conserving analytical
consumables. An identifier is a device that specifically identifies the type of biological agent collected by the system.
Identifiers are generally limited to a pre-selected set of agents and cannot identify agents outside of this set without the
addition of new identifier chemistry/equipment or preprogramming (Fatah et al., 2001).
Figure 2. Typical point detection automated architecture (with a combined trigger/cue)
Source: Fatah et al. (2001).
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Arens and Rosenbloom (2003) propose six future research agendas for incident management systems: encyclopedic digital
collections, a grid of unlimited computation, rapidly deployable sensors and effectors, a pervasive, secure communications
infrastructure, integrated analysis, fusion, and learning, virtual organizations, legal framework.
PRIOR LITERATURE
Existing literature reveals that there are a plethora of tools for risk assessment. Further the literature also shows that
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) was first applied to applied to large technological systems nearly thirty years ago. Since
then, we have seen many methodological advances and applications to nuclear power reactors: probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA), space systems, performance assessment, and incinerators of chemical munitions (Apostolakis, 2004). Apostolakis
(2004) discusses the use of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) in decision-making regarding the safety of complex
technological systems. The insights gained by QRA are compared with those from traditional safety methods and it is argued
that the two approaches complement each other. The importance of risk-informed rather than risk-based decision-making is
emphasized (Farrow, 2004).
To capture the multiple dimensions and perspectives of a system, Haimes (1981, 2004) introduces hierarchical holographic
modeling (HHM). Haimes (2002) also offers a holistic risk assessment and management framework for modeling the risks of
terrorism to the homeland. Two major interconnected systems are addressed: the homeland system and the terrorist networks
system. In modeling the two systems, the centrality of state variables is highlighted. Paté-Cornell (2002) presents a classic
probabilistic Bayesian model used in engineering risk analysis, which can be helpful in the fusion of information because it
allows computation of the posterior probability of an event given its prior probability and the quality of the signal
characterized by the probabilities of false positive and false negative. However, some critical issues remain such as (a) the
choice of the signals that are carefully monitored, (b) quick access to information when a source has been located and, (c) the
constitution of an extensive database or system that link existing databases allowing for storing and updating the information
in a useful way.
Wulf, Haimes, and Longstaff (2003) develop a roadmap toward modeling the complex structure, which consists of the
following four systems: Homeland, Terrorist networks, Socioeconomic and cultural environment, and geopolitical
environment that sustain terrorism. Risk analysis has already played some role informally, but a much larger and formal one
is needed since it has a centrally important role for protecting the world against the terrorism (Deisler, 2002). How one can
link the tools of risk assessment and knowledge of risk perception to develop risk management options for dealing with
extreme events is also a critical issue (Kunreuther, 2002).
Generally, risk analysis is derived from risk assessment and risk management. Risk assessment is an established methodology
for environment and public health issues (Farrow, 2004). It is still not easy to assess the amount of risk. The Risk Assessment
Cube is a simple and useful example to estimate the amount of risk. There are three components in the risk assessment cube:
probability of an incident, outcome severity, and duration of impact (Volonino and Robinson, 2004).
However the above approaches are limited in that they does not account for several parameters.  In this paper we anchor our
proposed framework on the economic theory of shortages. The next subsection provides a brief elaboration of the related
concepts.
Traditional theory of allocation deals with the fundamental question of how available productive resources can be used to the
greatest advantage in the production of goods and services. However, the situation that the emergency response systems are
facing does not directly fit the situation that the traditional economists have taken. When strong emotions are involved,
people tend to focus on the “badness” of the outcome, rather than on the probability that the outcome will occur. The
resulting probability neglect helps to explain excessive reactions to low-probability risks of catastrophe (Sunstein, 2003).
Emergency situations have considerable ambiguity and uncertainty about the likelihood of their occurrence and their
potential consequences (Kunreuther, 2002). This situation is similar to that of economics of shortage. Shortage is a persistent
feature of all economies. Consequences of shortage, such as misallocation of resources, delaying of completions of projects,
queuing, hoarding, rent-seeking, are widely observed and extensively analyzed (Kornai, 1980; Qian, 1994). This area deals
with a question of why there is shortage under governments which have immense power to allocate goods and services (Qian,
1994). Haskel and Martin (1993) show that the increase in skill shortages over the mid-1980s reduced productivity growth.
The theory of shortage deals with the several sub issues.
· Imperfect Information and lack of Information: The more imperfectly informed a consumer, the greater the friction
in adjustment and the more intensive will be the shortage or the greater the slack. Imperfect or partial information
does not lead to optimized solution for emergency response system. Often imperfect information leads to wrong
 3276
Kim et al.                                                                                                                Risk management issues in the emergency response systems
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th-14th 2005
decisions. Information sharing in the emergency response system can lead to creation of more correct information
with cross-checking (Kornai, 1980; Qian, 1994).
· Resource constraints – Inputs: Shortage means that inputs required for the fulfillment of some serious intention are
not available resulting in suboptimal decisions. Resources that are needed in an emergency situation are usually
short. Therefore, under the environment of resource shortage, efficient resource allocation is a crucial factor for
emergency response systems (Haskel and Martin, 1993; Kornai, 1980; Qian, 1994).
· Resource constraints – Local infrastructure: With limited infrastructure as is the case in many emergency situations
deciphering how to optimize the infrastructure is important in the use of existing emergency response systems.
Organization and coordination of scattered resources in the system impacts the efficiency. Infrastructure that is a
basis for various social systems is also vulnerable to several threats or risks. The infrastructure can be often a target
for offenders because the paralyzing of infrastructure strikes the whole social system a fatal blow in the long run. In
case of that the infrastructure is damaged, it is hard for emergency response systems to do the job properly (Haskel
and Martin, 1993; Kornai, 1980; Qian, 1994).
· Resource constraints – National infrastructure: Governmental systems and social economic systems such as
financial systems and public systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks and terror. Those systems provide resources
needed to other sub-infrastructures and coordinate allocation of resources. This role encourages terrorists to get
their targets on these systems (Haskel and Martin, 1993; Kornai, 1980; Qian, 1994).
· Timing – lags and delays: Early risk detection is essential for being able to address the most important information
in a persistent and prospective manner. Early risk detection includes the identification, characterization, evaluation
and dissemination of information on possible risks as well as the circumstances of appearance and distribution. The
greater the lags and the more rigid the adjustment of supply to changes in the initial demand, the more intensive the
shortage will be: the consumer is forced to search more, accept more forced substitution, and so on (Kornai, 1980;
Qian, 1994; Wiedemann, Clauberg, Karger, and Henseler, forthcoming).
· Resource constraints – Resource organizing: Under the resource constrained, performance of a system or a society
depends on how well resources are organized. In order to organize the constrained resources, it needs sufficient
information on resources, sophisticated tools integrating, analyzing, and learning the information, and flexible and
coordinated organizations (Kornai, 1980).
In addition, to the above issues, prior literature has articulated the following concerns that are pertinent in the emergency
arena.
· Information overload: This is the state of having too much information to make a decision or remained informed
about a topic. Lack of a method for comparing and processing different kinds of information can all contribute to
this effect (Angus and Daniel, 1974). Under time-constrained situations, information overload often leads to
incorrect reactions.
· Privacy concerns: Some studies on economics of privacy have exhibited that when information about customers’
tastes and purchase history is available and can be shared among sellers, market laws alone might produce Pareto
optimal outcomes (Acquisti, 2004).
· Public fear: This is itself a cost, and it is associated with many other costs, in the form of ripple effects produced by
fear. Fear reduction is a critical issue, if the benefits of the response can be shown to outweigh the costs (Sunstein,
2003). Public fear as well as physical damages of infrastructure is a threat to the whole system. Public fear makes it
hard to operate various social systems including emergency response systems.
RISK ISSUES
The research question raised here is how to assess risk with respect to existing emergency response systems. To answer this,
we have developed a theory based risk framework which is presented as part of Table 2. The framework is described using
seven categories of problems: problem of information sharing (R1), problem of resource allocation (R2), problem of
insufficient infrastructure (R3), problem of early detection and response (R4), problem of resource organizing (R5), problem
of information handling, security and privacy (R6), and problem of protecting social overhead capital (R7). Each problem has
its own sub-categories. To justify our framework of risk, two distinct existing incident management systems are analyzed
(Atabakhsh, Larson, Petersen, Violette, and Chen, 2004).
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Underlying theoretical background Citation
Problem
Risk Description Citation
Inadequate and imperfect information (Theory of shortage) Kornai (1980); Qian (1994)
Problem of information sharing (R1)
Technical barrier for
information sharing
(R1.1)
The tools necessary to retrieve, filter, integrate, and intelligently
present relevant information have not yet been sufficiently refined.
Atabakhsh et al. (2004); Chen
et al. (2003)
Communication
barrier for
information sharing
(R1.2)
State and federal agencies have their own information
disconnections. They do not open lines of communication
Atabakhsh et al. (2004); Chen
et al. (2003); Hanson (2002)
Regulation barriers
to share information
(R1.3)
Federal, state, and local regulations require that agreements
between agencies within their respective jurisdictions receive
advanced approval from their governing hierarchy.
Atabakhsh et al. (2004)
Political barriers to
share information
(R1.4)
State and federal agencies have their own objectives. Sometime,
those objectives conflict each other. Shared information can be
limited under its own objectives.
Hanson (2002)
Resource constraints – Input (Theory of shortage) Kornai (1980); Haskel and
Martin (1993); Qian (1994)
Problem of resource allocation (R2)
Limited physical
resources (R2.1)
A society of limited resources can not afford to prepare for each
and every conceivable disaster.
Arens and Rosenbloom (2003)
Limited human
resources (R2.2)
Supplying human resources, who are capable to deal with
emergency situation, is extremely constrained. Experts are not
evenly distributed and transferring personnel to the emergent
places is very limited.
Arens and Rosenbloom (2003)
Resource constraints – Insufficient infrastructure (Theory of shortage) Kornai (1980); Haskel and
Martin (1993); Qian(1994)
Problem of insufficient local infrastructure (R3a)
Jamming of
communications
(R3.1)
In  an  emergent  situation,  the  surge  of  calls  can  paralyze  the
communications network.
Gilbert, Isenberg, Faecher,
Papay, Spielvogel, Woodard,
and Badolato (2003)
Reduced reliability
of communications
(R3.2)
The loss of or degradation of radio communications between all
parties responding to an attack makes it hard to respond properly.
Gilbert et al. (2003)
Secure
communications
infrastructure (R3.3)
Protecting computer systems from intrusion and sabotage and
enabling recovery from such disruptions would ensure that
emergency response teams operate in safety, free from
surveillance and malicious interference.
Arens and Rosenbloom (2003)
Loss of
communications
capacity (R3.4)
Communications facilities which have access to the Internet are
vulnerable for the cyber attack.
Gilbert et al. (2003)
Problem of insufficient national infrastructure (R3b)
Risk to economic
structures (R3.5)
Financial institutes which compose of a lot of computers and
network systems are vulnerable to the cyber attacks.
Haimes (2002); Haimes and
Horowitz (2004); Wulf et al.
(2003)
Risk to social
infrastructures and
government
operations (R3.6)
The cyber attack to the government networks make the operations
by the government to be paralyzed.
Haimes (2002); Haimes and
Horowitz (2004); Wulf et al.
(2003)
Risk to cyber-
physical
infrastructures
(R3.7)
Cyber infrastructures are vulnerable to the direct attack by
terrorists.
Haimes (2002); Haimes and
Horowitz (2004); Wulf et al.
(2003)
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Timeliness; Lag and Delays (Theory of Shortage) Kornai (1980); Qian (1994);
Wiedemann et al.
(forthcoming)
Problem of early detection and response (R4)
Loss of control of
first responders at
the scene (R4.1)
In a terrorist attack, first responders would likely be at greater risk
because of their limited ability to determine the cause and extent
of the situation they find, while also being compelled to provide
immediate aid to the injured and the containment of damages.
Gilbert et al. (2003)
Rapidly deployable
sensors and effectors
(R4.2)
It is essential to deploy the sensors and effectors quickly so their
network autonomously among themselves and communicate with
controllers outside the crisis zone.
Arens and Rosenbloom (2003)
Resource constraints – Resource organizing (Theory of Shortage) Kornai (1980)
Problem of resource organizing (R5)
Lack of
encyclopedic digital
collections (R5.1)
Lack of information on geography, environments, resources, and
potential response personnel and organizations, together with
software systems make it hard to answer to pertinent questions.
Arens and Rosenbloom (2003)
Integrated analysis,
fusion, and learning
(R5.2)
Learning and training technology must be adapted to determine
which people need to perform their jobs at which time and ensure
that information is tracked and delivered when appropriate.
Arens and Rosenbloom (2003)
Virtual
organizations (R5.3)
Uniting geographically dispersed people, software, and hardware
systems into flexible, resilient, dynamic, and coordinated teams
would be essential parts of the response in emergency situations.
Arens and Rosenbloom (2003)
Information overload; Economics of privacy Acquisti (2004); Angus and
Daniel (1974)
Problem of information handling, security, and privacy (R6)
Overload problem
(R6.1)
The problem that the government agencies can not handle massive
amounts of information.
Chen et al. (2003)
Security issue (R6.2) Data shared between agencies is secure. Atabakhsh et al. (2004)
Privacy issue (R6.3) Data shared between agencies that the privacy of individuals is
respected.
Atabakhsh et al. (2004)
Legal framework
(R6.4)
Protecting individual privacy and civil liberties while resolving the
jurisdictional and legal barriers that hamper or even prevent
necessary and proper information gathering and sharing by
governmental and other organizations during unexpected events.
Arens and Rosenbloom (2003)
Public fear Sunstein (2003)
Problem of protecting social capital (R7)
Risk to human lives
and psychological
unrest in society
(R7.1)
Public fear is itself a cost, and it is associated with many other
costs, in the form of ripple effects produced by fear.
Haimes (2002); Haimes and
Horowitz (2004); Sunstein
(2003); Wulf et al. (2003)
Table 2. Risk Framework in Emergency Management Situation
In  this  study,  two example  systems are  discussed:  Urban Search  & Rescue  (US&R) Task Forces  of  the  National  Resource
Typing System in the NIMS3 and biological detection systems.4
Further, we apply the risk framework (Table 2) to the two systems. The first case is the Urban search-and-rescue (US&R)
Task Force of the National Resource Typing System in NIMS. Urban search-and-rescue (US&R) involves the location,
rescue, and initial medical stabilization of victims trapped in confined spaces. Structural collapse is most often the cause of
victims being trapped, but victims may also be trapped in transportation accidents, mines and collapsed trenches.  Urban
search-and-rescue is considered a "multi-hazard" discipline, as it may be needed for a variety of emergencies or disasters,
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004).
4 Fatah, et al. (2001).
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including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms and tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist
activities, and hazardous materials releases (FEMA, 2003).
The second example is that of biological detection systems. It is a detection system against biological terrorism, developed by
the Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and working
with National Institute of Justice (NIJ) (Fatah et al., 2001). The results are shown in Table 3 & 4.
Component Metric Description Risks Situation
Personnel Number of people per
response
70 person response R2.1 Limited manpower can not afford to prepare for every
conceivable incident
Personnel Areas of
specialization
Technical level in
area of specialty
R4.1 The person who is exposed to an incident is likely to
be at great risk because of her/his limited ability to
determine the cause and the extent of the situation.
Personnel Sustained operations 24-hour S&R
operations. Self-
sufficient for first
72 hours
R6.1 Overload operations might make the person not to
make good decisions and respond correctly.
Personnel Organization Multi-disciplinary
organization
R1.1 Multi-disciplinary organization often suffers from lack
of information sharing and different patterns of
communication.
Equipment  Sustained operations Potential mission
duration of up to
10 days
R2.1 Low probability and high impact incidents require a
lot of equipment at the same time.
Equipment  Communications
equipment
R3.4,
R3.2
Loss of communication link, congestion of
communication channels or overloading on the
network hinders relevant operations.
Equipment  Rescue (Medical,
Technical, Logistics)
equipments
R2.1 It is hard to keep enough equipment to deal with every
incident in every place.
Table 3. Example of Risk Assessment of Urban Search & Rescue Task Forces of the National Resource Typing System (Type I)
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004).
Components Description Risks  Situations
Trigger/Cue Determine any change in particulatebackground at the sensor
R4.2 It is essential to deploy the sensors and effectors to
detect any changes in a certain area.
Collector Sampling; for example, sample containingparticulates suspended in water
R2.1 Insufficient resources make it hard to respond in case
of t incidents occur in many places
Detector
Check if the particulates are biological or
inorganic  in  origin.  If  they  are,  they  are
passed through to the next level of analysis.
Otherwise, they are not passed to the next
analysis to conserve analytical
consumables.
R5.2 The advent of the unexpected biological agents needs
various experts in the multi-discipline area.
Identifier
Identify the type of biological agents R1.1 Incomplete information leads to incorrect decisions.
Lack of information sharing might hinder the right
judgment.
Table 4. Example of Risk assessment of Components of Biological Detection System Components
Source: Fatah et al. (2001).
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides an analysis of the existing work. Based on the review of previous literature, in this paper we have
proposed a risk framework of the emergency response systems. This framework provides an approach to assess the risks on
incident management systems and emergency response systems. Proof of concept is demonstrated by applying the risk
framework to two existing incident management systems. The framework shows the components of the incident management
systems and the risk items on those incident management systems.
A limitation of the methodology is the lack of a quantitative metric meaning to say the methodology does not show the
results through a quantitative measure. The measure of discriminant validity between lists of risk is essential to justify our
research results. To effectively mitigate multi-incident coordinated terrorist threats, it is important to consider risk in incident
management systems. This paper represents one of the first efforts to study this area.
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